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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
George E. Banks appeals to this court from a final 
judgment entered in the district court on August 30, 1996, 
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. S 2254. Banks committed the crimes leading to his 
conviction and sentencing in the state court and finally to 
his petition for habeas corpus on September 25, 1982, 
when he shot 14 people in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, 
killing 13 of them. The victims included Banks' four 
girlfriends and their children, most of whom were Banks' 
children as well. Banks, who was born from an interracial 
relationship, apparently committed the murders because he 
preferred his children to die rather than grow up in what he 
thought was a racist world. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 
521 A.2d 1, 4-7 (Pa. 1987) ("Banks I"). 
 
Prior to trial in the Luzerne County Court of Common 
Pleas, Banks' attorney raised issues with respect to Banks' 
competency to stand trial. Accordingly, the common pleas 
court held several pre-trial competency hearings pursuant 
to the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976, 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 SS 7402-7403 (West Supp. 1986), each 
time concluding that Banks was competent to stand trial. 
In addition, during the trial, Banks' attorney made several 
unsuccessful motions seeking competency determinations. 
 
During the trial, Banks' attorney attempted to establish 
that Banks was legally insane at the time of the offenses, 
 
                                2 
 
 
 
or, alternatively, that his capacity was diminished by 
alcohol and pills, thereby precluding a finding offirst 
degree murder. Against the advice of counsel, Banks 
testified and offered a defense that the police, the Wilkes- 
Barre mayor, and the district attorney were conspiring 
against him. Banks also cross-examined a ballistic expert, 
and directed counsel with respect to questions for cross- 
examination of several of the Commonwealth's witnesses. 
 
On June 21, 1983, the jury convicted Banks of 12 counts 
of first degree murder, as well as of third degree murder, 
attempted murder, and other related counts. The next day 
the jury voted to impose the death penalty. Accordingly, the 
court sentenced Banks to 12 "consecutive" death sentences 
and various consecutive terms of imprisonment. 
 
Banks filed an appeal, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed his convictions and sentences in Banks I. 
The court upheld the trial court's determination that Banks 
was competent to stand trial, found that there was ample 
evidence that Banks had the requisite intent to kill his 
victims, and resolved the remaining issues on appeal 
against Banks. Chief Justice Nix and Justice Zappala 
dissented on the ground that the common pleas court made 
the trial a mockery of justice by allowing Banks to take over 
his own defense. 
 
In February 1989 Banks filed a petition in the common 
pleas court under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing 
Act ("PCHA"), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 9541 et seq. (West 1982), 
seeking relief from the judgment of conviction and 
sentence. The Pennsylvania courts treated this petition as 
if filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 9541 (West Supp. 1997), which had replaced 
the PCHA. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 656 A.2d 467, 469 
n.4 (Pa. 1995) ("Banks II"). The common pleas court denied 
him relief, and on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
finding all his claims meritless, affirmed in Banks II. 
 
On February 21, 1996, after Governor Ridge signed a 
warrant for his execution, Banks filed a motion in the 
district court seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a 
motion to stay the execution, and a motion for appointment 
of counsel. The district court granted the motion to proceed 
 
                                3 
 
 
 
in forma pauperis stayed the execution, provided for the 
appointment of counsel, and directed Banks to file a 
habeas petition by March 22, 1996. Banks v. Horn, 928 F. 
Supp. 512, 514 (M.D. Pa. 1996) ("Banks III"). Banks then 
filed a petition raising the following claims: 
 
       1. He did not make a knowing, intelligent and 
       voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to 
       counsel before the trial court allowed him to assume 
       control of the presentation of evidence and cross- 
       examination of witnesses; 
 
       2. He was not competent to waive his right to counsel; 
 
       3. He did not make a knowing, intelligent and 
       voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against 
       self-incrimination before the trial court allowed him to 
       assume control of the presentation of evidence and 
       cross-examination of witnesses; 
 
       4. He was not competent to waive his Fifth 
       Amendment right against self-incrimination; 
 
       5. He was not competent to be tried and sentenced; 
       therefore, the trial court's judgment violated the Due 
       Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
       Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
       Amendment; 
 
       6. During the penalty phase of the trial the court's 
       instructions to the jury, the verdict slip, and the jury 
       poll all required the jury to find unanimously both 
       aggravating and mitigating circumstances in violation 
       of the Eighth Amendment; 
 
       7. The trial court's failure in the capital sentencing 
       part of the trial to instruct the jury on life 
       imprisonment without parole violated the holding in 
       Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 
       2187 (1994), that the Eighth Amendment required 
       such an instruction; 
 
       8. The lack of uniformity in death penalty procedures 
       in Pennsylvania did not provide a narrowing of 
       discretion in the imposition of a death sentence as the 
       Eighth Amendment requires; 
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       9. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it 
       could render a verdict of life imprisonment based on a 
       finding of mercy violated the Eighth Amendment as 
       applied in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 
       837 (1987); 
 
       10. Pennsylvania's Proportionality Review Statute 
       deprived Banks of his right to due process under the 
       Fourteenth Amendment; 
 
       11. The trial court's failure to voir dire prospective 
       jurors on whether they automatically would impose 
       death on a finding of first degree murder was in 
       violation of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 
       2222 (1992). 
 
Banks v. Horn, 939 F. Supp. 1165, 1166 (M.D. Pa. 1996) 
("Banks IV"). 
 
Banks recognized that his habeas corpus petition faced a 
procedural hurdle because he had not raised claims 7, 9, 
and 11 in the state courts. Consequently, he filed a motion 
to remand the petition to the state courts and to stay the 
proceedings in the district court pending exhaustion of 
claims 7, 9, and 11 in the state courts. See Banks III, 928 
F. Supp. at 514. The Commonwealth opposed the motion 
and urged the district court to dismiss the petition as 
mixed under Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198 
(1982), because it included both exhausted and 
unexhausted claims. By order of April 29, 1996, the district 
court denied Banks' motion because in its view the 
adoption in 1995 of the Capital Unitary Review Act, 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9570 et seq. (West Supp. 1997), which 
limited death penalty appeals to one "unitary" direct appeal 
of all issues, barred further review of Banks' case in the 
state courts. See Banks III, 928 F. Supp. at 514. The 
Commonwealth then filed a motion for reconsideration on 
the ground that the Capital Unitary Review Act does not 
apply to cases in which the death penalty was imposed 
before January 1, 1996. 
 
The district court agreed with the Commonwealth's 
contention. It concluded, however, that in Pennsylvania "an 
issue is waived for purposes of post conviction relief if the 
petitioner failed to raise the issue and it could have been 
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raised before trial, at trial, on direct appeal, or in prior 
collateral proceedings. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 9544(b) 
[(West Supp. 1997)]." Banks III, 928 F. Supp. at 515. The 
court then indicated that second or subsequent petitions 
for post conviction relief will not be entertained in 
Pennsylvania unless the petitioner makes a strong prima 
facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have 
occurred. There is a miscarriage of justice if the 
proceedings resulting in conviction were so unfair that no 
civilized society could tolerate them or if the defendant was 
actually innocent of the crimes charged. Id. 
 
The court found the innocence prong inapplicable to the 
unexhausted claims and interpreted the other prong as 
referring to errors which undermine the truth-determining 
process. The court concluded from its analysis of 
Pennsylvania cases addressing similar claims that a 
Pennsylvania court would not find that the allegations in 
any of the unexhausted claims set forth circumstances 
amounting to a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 518-21. 
Therefore, the district court held that state law clearly 
foreclosed review by the state courts of the unexhausted 
claims which thus were procedurally barred. Id. at 521, 
citing Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Consequently, it concluded that Banks' petition was not 
mixed under Rose v. Lundy, and it therefore denied the 
Commonwealth's motion to dismiss the petition. 
 
The Commonwealth then moved again to dismiss the 
petition under Rose v. Lundy, this time alleging that Banks 
had not exhausted his claim concerning waiver of his right 
to counsel. The district court denied the motion because 
Chief Justice Nix in Banks I based his dissenting opinion 
precisely on that issue. Banks v. Horn, Civ. No. 96-0294, at 
(M.D. Pa. July 11, 1996). Consequently, the district court 
believed that the waiver of counsel contention was available 
to the entire Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and thus had 
been "fairly presented" to that court, even if only by the 
dissent. The district court also found that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court sufficiently addressed the issue in Banks II. 
 
Thus, the stage was set for the district court to address 
the exhausted claims on the merits and it did so in Banks 
IV. The court began its analysis by discussing the effect of 
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the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which was 
enacted on April 24, 1996, two months after Banksfiled his 
habeas petition. The court noted that the courts of appeals 
were divided on whether the AEDPA applies to cases 
pending on the date of its enactment, but found that it 
need not resolve that question because it would make no 
difference "if no factual matters arise which require the 
application of the new standard of proof, or if no rule of law 
is applicable which may not be `clearly established.' " Banks 
IV, 939 F. Supp. at 1169, citing Dickerson v. Vaughn, 90 
F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The court found that the outcome of this case would be 
the same under the AEDPA and under prior law. Id. at 
1176. The court also found that the provisions in the 
AEDPA pertaining to death penalty litigation procedures did 
not apply because Pennsylvania's Capital Unitary Review 
Act only applies to cases in which the death penalty was 
imposed after January 1, 1996. Banks IV, 939 F. Supp. at 
1168. The district court ultimately rejected all of Banks' 
exhausted claims on the merits but did not address claims 
7, 9, and 11, which were procedurally barred. 
 
In view of its conclusions, the court denied Banks' 
petition. Nevertheless, it found that there was "probable 
cause" to appeal, indicating that "[w]hile most of the claims 
raised by Banks do not seem to be particularly close issues, 
those issues related to the procedural bar at least are 
sufficiently close for a certificate of probable cause. We 
therefore shall so certify. . . ." Id. at 1176. The court 
extended the stay of execution "until final disposition of any 
appeal . . . ." Id. Banks then appealed. We exercise plenary 
review on this appeal. See Ross v. Petsock, 868 F.2d 639, 
640 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Significantly, on January 15, 1997, after he filed this 
appeal, Banks filed a second PCRA petition in the Luzerne 
County Court of Common Pleas in which he raised claims 
7, 9, and 11, the claims which the district court found were 
procedurally barred, as well as one additional claim. On 
August 20, 1997, the common pleas court denied the 
petition holding that it was procedurally barred. 
Commonwealth v. Banks, Nos. 1290 etc., slip op. at 7 (C.P. 
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Ct. Aug. 20, 1997). Nevertheless, the court indicated that 
"it may well be that the Supreme Court will review the 
merits, and accordingly we will take the time to explain why 
we believe and find each of the issues raised is without any 
legal merit." Id. The court then did exactly that. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
We first address a preliminary procedural issue. As we 
have indicated, Banks filed his petition before the effective 
date of the AEDPA, but the district court adjudicated the 
matter after that date. Nevertheless, in conformity with 
prior law, the district court issued a certificate of probable 
cause rather than a certificate of appealability as provided 
in AEDPA. We have determined that under the AEDPA, 28 
U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1), district courts can issue certificates of 
appealability. United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 472-74 
(3d Cir. 1997). In this case we need not decide whether the 
district court should have issued a certificate of 
appealability rather than of probable cause as we will treat 
the certificate of probable cause as both a certificate of 
probable cause and a certificate of appealability because we 
ultimately may hold in some future case that the AEDPA 
governs procedural issues on appeals filed after its effective 
date. Furthermore, we face no issue regarding the scope of 
the certificate, see 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(3), as we are 
confining our disposition to the single issue on which the 
district court granted the certificate. See Eyer, 113 F.3d at 
474. 
 
Banks argues that the district court erred in finding that 
the relaxed waiver standard, applicable to death penalty 
cases in Pennsylvania state courts, does not apply to 
second or subsequent PCRA petitions. He contends that 
"waiver will never be applied in a capital case where the 
result would be the imposition of a sentence of death in a 
manner clearly contrary to the express law of the land," br. 
at 18, even in a proceeding initiated by a second PCRA 
petition. Thus, he urges that his petition was mixed 
because the Pennsylvania courts would not hold that his 
unexhausted claims are procedurally barred. Therefore, in 
his view the district court erred in not dismissing his 
petition under Rose v. Lundy. 
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In order to prevent federal habeas corpus review, a state 
procedural rule must be "consistently or regularly applied." 
Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 588-89, 108 S.Ct. 
1981, 1988 (1988); see also Ford v. Georgia, 489 U.S. 411, 
423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 857 (1991). Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has held that if a state supreme court 
faithfully has applied a procedural rule in "the vast 
majority" of cases, its willingness in a few cases to overlook 
the rule and address a claim on the merits does not mean 
that it does not apply the procedural rule regularly or 
consistently. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n.6, 109 
S.Ct. 1211, 1217 n.6 (1989). Accordingly, "an occasional 
act of grace by a state court in excusing or disregarding a 
state procedural rule does not render the rule inadequate" 
to procedurally bar advancing a habeas corpus claim in a 
district court. Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 342 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 
Therefore, we examine the decisions of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in death penalty cases to ascertain whether 
that court consistently or regularly bars second or 
subsequent PCRA petitions which may not meet the court's 
criteria for such petitions, which include the existence of "a 
strong prima facie showing . . . that a miscarriage of justice 
may have occurred." Commonwealth v. Beasley, 678 A.2d 
773, 771 (Pa. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1257 (1997). 
We also consider whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
in reviewing petitions, will treat particular issues on the 
merits even though they appear to be procedurally barred 
because, as the district court noted, under the PCRA, 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9544(b) (West Supp. 1997), Banks' 
claims 7, 9, and 11 appear to be waived and thus to be 
procedurally barred in the state courts. See 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(3) ("To be eligible for relief under [the 
PCRA], the petitioner must plead and prove . . .[t]hat the 
allegation of error has not been previously litigated or 
waived."). We consider both points because in Pennsylvania 
a procedural bar may arise with respect to a second or 
subsequent PCRA petition as a whole or with respect to 
particular issues within the petition. 
 
Of course, review of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decisions is critical because as we explained in Toulson v. 
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Beyer, 987 F.2d at 988-89, in the absence of a state court 
decision indicating that a habeas corpus petitioner is 
clearly precluded from state court relief, the district court 
should dismiss the claim for failure to exhaust even if it is 
not likely that the state court will consider petitioner's 
claim on the merits. We more recently applied this policy in 
Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted): 
 
       [W]e must be certain that state review is clearly 
       foreclosed lest we deprive state courts of an 
       opportunity to correct their own errors, if any. It is 
       therefore not for this Court to decide whether the 
       Pennsylvania courts will conclude that the defects in 
       the proceedings surrounding Doctor's conviction rise to 
       the level of a miscarriage of justice as defined by 
       Pennsylvania law. We cannot conclude that there is no 
       chance that the Pennsylvania courts would find a 
       miscarriage of justice sufficient to override the waiver 
       requirements and permit review under the PCRA. 
 
See also Peoples v. Fulcomer, 882 F.2d 828, 831-32 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 
Fortunately, we are not without guidance from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on whether that court 
consistently or regularly applies procedural bars to second 
or subsequent PCRA petitions in death penalty cases either 
to the petition as a whole or as to issues within it. In 
Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 633 A.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (Pa. 
1993), the court initially rejected the petitioner's claims on 
the merits. The court then found that those claims had 
been litigated previously and thus could not be addressed 
in a PCRA action, and ended by finding that because the 
petitioner failed to meet the criteria for a second or 
subsequent petition, the PCRA court did not err in denying 
the petition. Thus, the court rejected the petitioner's claims 
on the merits before finding them procedurally barred. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352 (Pa. 1995), 
a death penalty case involving a second PCRA petition, the 
court began by outlining the criteria for post conviction 
relief under the PCRA. Then, after quoting the then existing 
PCRA waiver provisions, it stated: "We note, however, that 
 
                                10 
 
 
 
it is this Court's practice to address all issues arising in a 
death penalty case, irrespective of a finding of waiver." Id. at 
356 n.6. The court then set forth the criteria for 
entertaining a second PCRA petition, after which it noted: 
"[i]t is with awareness of this standard that we proceed to 
consider Appellant's claims." Id. at 357. 
 
In the balance of its Travaglia opinion, the court 
extensively discussed the merits of all of petitioner's 
numerous claims except for a claim previously litigated. Id. 
at 365-66. The court even assumed arguendo for the 
purposes of several claims that there is a right to effective 
assistance of counsel on collateral attack under the state 
constitution, id. at 367-69, "[i]n the interest of giving a 
condemned man the benefit of every possible doubt," id. at 
367. The court's extensive discussion of claims pertaining 
to post-conviction proceedings, id. at 367-70, makes clear 
that it did not limit its inquiry to whether there had been 
a miscarriage of justice at trial, the applicable criterion for 
entertaining a second petition. Indeed, the court did not 
expressly address that question at all. 
 
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Beasley, 678 A.2d 773, a 
death penalty case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated 
that a "second or subsequent post-conviction request for 
relief will not be entertained unless a strong prima facie 
showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of 
justice may have occurred." Id. at 777. This standard 
requires a showing of either actual innocence or that the 
proceedings resulting in conviction were "so unfair that a 
miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society 
can tolerate." Id. The court found that the petitioner did not 
meet either test, so that the PCRA petition "could be 
dismissed on this ground alone." Id. However, the court 
went on to state that "[n]evertheless, since this is a capital 
case, this court will address appellant's claims." Id. 
 
The court then noted that the petitioner still must comply 
with the general requirements for filing a PCRA petition, 
that is that the claims have not been previously litigated or 
waived, or, if waived, that the waiver is excused. Id. at 778. 
The court found that pursuant to these requirements the 
petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims should 
be addressed. Yet the court went further and addressed a 
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claim, the withholding of exculpatory evidence, unrelated to 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, without even 
mentioning whether the issue had been previously litigated 
(which we recognize is not likely) or waived. Id. at 783. The 
court therefore decided Beasley on the merits rather than 
on the basis of either of the two procedural bar rules: one 
limiting second petitions as a whole, and one barring 
consideration of waived or previously litigated claims. 
Indeed, the passage quoted above -- "since this is a capital 
case, this court will address appellant's claims" -- suggests 
that the general rule concerning second PCRA petitions 
does not apply to capital cases. 
 
We conclude from Szuchon, Travaglia, and Beasley that, 
notwithstanding a procedural bar, it is possible that in a 
death penalty case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will 
not refuse either to entertain a second PCRA petition or to 
address the claims raised in it. Indeed, as we explained 
above, the common pleas court in Banks' second petition 
apparently thought the same thing as it indicated that 
despite its determination that the petition was barred "it 
may well be that the Supreme Court" will review its merits.1 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in 
finding Banks' unexhausted claims procedurally barred. 
Although the district court correctly found in Banks III that 
Banks' unexhausted claims do not meet the stated criteria 
for Pennsylvania courts to consider a second PCRA petition, 
we believe that Banks III did not give adequate recognition 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases demonstrating 
that it effectively looks beyond those criteria in death 
penalty cases. 
 
In reaching our result, we have not overlooked the 
Commonwealth's arguments that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has declared issues waived in some death 
penalty cases. However, in the cases the Commonwealth 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The common pleas court set forth that possibility because it believed 
that the Supreme Court "may not always have found and enforced the 
waiver rules." Commonwealth v. Banks, slip op. at 6. It was of the view, 
however, that "a trial court has no authority to ignore the clear letter 
and spirit of the legislative directions contained in the [PCRA]." Id. Of 
course, we are deciding this case on the basis of what the Supreme 
Court is likely to do. 
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cites, which we note in the main are direct appeals, 
notwithstanding having declared the issues in question 
waived, the court nevertheless discussed their merits. See 
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130, 136, 139-40 (Pa. 
1996) (issue held waived but rejected on the merits); 
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 567 A.2d 1376, 1381 (Pa. 1989) 
(noting that "[a]lthough waiver of any claim in a capital case 
appears to be contradictory to the relaxed waiver rules 
afforded [death penalty] appellants" claims may be waived, 
but still considering the merits of the claim); 
Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 513 A.2d 373, 378-79 (Pa. 
1986). 
 The Commonwealth also cites Commonwealth v. Jasper, 
610 A.2d 949, 953 n.6 (Pa. 1992), but that case merely 
reaffirms "the rule that challenges to the selection of a jury 
can be waived by a failure to object appropriately." The 
court nevertheless refused to address the waiver problem 
"[b]ecause our law firmly disposes of the issue of 
excludability on the merits." On the other hand, 
Commonwealth v. DeHart, 650 A.2d 38, 43 (Pa. 1994), 
which the Commonwealth also cites, was a PCRA case, and 
it provides some support for the Commonwealth's 
arguments because there the court refused to address a 
previously litigated claim. However, the court vacated the 
sentence on other grounds. 
 
We also have not overlooked the Commonwealth's 
contention that Banks does not meet the criteria cited in 
Szuchon for entertaining a second PCRA petition. Szuchon, 
633 A.2d at 1099-1100. Yet in Szuchon the court 
entertained a petition which also failed to meet those 
criteria, apparently considering the case on the merits 
rather than according to the procedural rule. Id. at 1099. 
 
At most, the cases on which the Commonwealth relies, 
including Szuchon, demonstrate that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court does not apply the Pennsylvania procedural 
bar rules consistently in death penalty cases. The cases do 
not indicate that an examination of the merits of Banks' 
claims is "clearly foreclosed" as Toulson requires for us to 
find them procedurally barred. We said in Toulson that "we 
are uncertain how the New Jersey state courts would 
resolve the procedural default issue. In light of this, we will 
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not presume how the state courts would rule on 
[petitioner's] claims." Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d at 989. We 
are no more certain as to how the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court will view Banks' claims 7, 9, and 11. 
 
In this regard we point out that federal courts should be 
most cautious before reaching a conclusion dependent 
upon an intricate analysis of state law that a claim is 
procedurally barred. Toulson surely made that point clear 
and the enactment of the AEDPA, which overall is intended 
to reduce federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings, 
reenforces the point. In questionable cases, even those not 
involving capital punishment, it is better that the state 
courts make the determination of whether a claim is 
procedurally barred. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth contends that the 1995 
amendments to the PCRA, as distinguished from the 
inapplicable Capital Unitary Review Act procedures, show 
that Banks' petition is barred. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 9545(b)(1) and (2) (West Supp. 1997). The Commonwealth 
argues that any second PCRA petition Banks filed would be 
untimely (a third basis for erection of a procedural bar), 
and that even if timely his unexhausted claims fail to meet 
the criteria for granting post-conviction relief. Br. at 19-22. 
 
While it is true that the text of the 1995 PCRA 
amendments supports these contentions, it is not clear that 
these amendments are dispositive. The Commonwealth 
does not refer us to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case 
applying the PCRA as amended in 1995 to support its 
views. Furthermore, in Szuchon and Beasley the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the merits of 
claims which seemingly were precluded by the PCRA 
provisions then in force. We also point out that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to exercise strong 
control of procedures in death penalty cases. Indeed, on 
August 11, 1997, the court issued an order pursuant to its 
administrative powers in Pa. Const. art. 5, S 10, in In re: 
Suspension of the Capital Unitary Review Act etc., No. 224, 
in which it suspended permanently the Capital Unitary 
Review Act. 
 
In the circumstances, we are not confident that the 
 
                                14 
 
 
 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, even in the face of the 1995 
amendments to the PCRA, will abandon its practice of 
reaching the merits of claims in PCRA petitions in capital 
cases regardless of the failure of the petition to meet the 
appropriate procedural criteria.2 Consequently, applying 
Toulson, we cannot find that review of Banks' unexhausted 
claims has been foreclosed.3 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In concluding we make two points. First, we are well 
aware that notwithstanding this opinion, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court may hold that Banks' unexhausted claims 
are procedurally barred on any of the possible bases to 
which we have made reference. Indeed, we are not holding 
that they are not barred and certainly our opinion could 
not have a preclusive effect on that point in the 
Pennsylvania courts. We are holding only that we cannot 
say with confidence that they are barred. Second, in 
reaching our result we are sensitive to the independence of 
the Pennsylvania courts and of that state's sovereignty. 
Thus, we are reluctant to consider a habeas corpus claim 
at a time when a petitioner may be able to invoke a state 
procedure to grant a remedy in the state courts if he is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In writing this opinion we have assumed, as did the common pleas 
court when it denied Banks' petition on August 20, 1997, that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately will decide whether claims 7, 9, 
and 11 are procedurally barred. That assumption, however, may not be 
correct because the 1995 amendments to the PCRA provide that an 
order denying a petitioner relief in a case in which the death penalty has 
been imposed "shall be reviewable only by petition for allowance of 
appeal to the Supreme Court." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9546(d) (West 
Supp. 1997). However, because Banks has at least the opportunity to 
seek leave to appeal in the Supreme Court (and failing to obtain that 
leave may be able to appeal to the Superior Court) we cannot say that 
he has no further state remedies. 
 
3. It is, of course, possible in death penalty cases (and other cases as 
well) that future experience will show that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court consistently and regularly applies the 1995 amendments to the 
PCRA and thereby creates a procedural bar sufficient to satisfy the 
standard of Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. at 589, 108 S.Ct. at 1988. 
That time, however, has not yet been reached. 
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entitled to relief. In view of our conclusions, we will vacate 
the judgment of August 30, 1996, and will remand the case 
to the district court to dismiss the petition without 
prejudice as mixed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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